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Abstract  
The initiation, funding, servicing and monitoring of loans by financial intermediaries 
has been done without regard to some critical factors which could have averted the likelihood 
of default. The study aimed at measuring the extent that owner-specific, borrower-specific, loan 
and lender-specific characteristics could determine the probability of loan default. The study 
used logistic regression for 224 business customers of a bank in Ghana from its nation-wide 
branches. The study found that owner’s extra income (ownership characteristics), multiple 
borrowing, diversion of loan purpose (borrower characteristics), loan price, loan purpose, loan 
age, repayment plan (loan characteristics) and underfunding (lender characteristics) 
significantly determined the probability of business loan default. The overall model predicted up 
to 78.5% of variations in the likelihood of default. The hierarchy of strong determinants given 
by their odd ratios were loan purpose (47.9 times), underfunding (19.2 times), diversion of loan 
purpose (11.7 times) multiple borrowing (9.4 times) and owner’s extra income  (8.2  times). The 
study can conclude that financial intermediaries should be wary of the credit granting process 
taking cognisance of ownership, borrower, loan and lender characteristics especially the 
significant predictors. Combining quantitative and qualitative variables as determinants of 
default could be considered in future. 
 
Key words: borrower-specific characteristics, default, financial intermediaries, lender 
characteristics, loan characteristics, ownership characteristics.   
JEL Classification:  G32, G21 
 
Introduction  
 
Economic units will always engage in activities to satisfy their consumption of 
economic resources. Most of such activities are realized through the financial system. 
The financial system is the interaction of the activities of financial markets and 
institutions (Casu, Girardone and Molyneux, 2006). The financial system is made up of 
an interaction of market participants whose activities serve the needs of the other. 
Surplus units (lenders) and deficit units (borrowers) interplay through the exchange of 
contracts and transactions to satisfy and smoothen consumption after both parties have 
been duly rewarded either for the use of resources or for postponing consumption to a 
future date. The financial services sector especially banks have been lauded for their  
immense contribution to the growth and development of the economy. They do so 
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mainly by extending credit to economic units (individuals, households, firms and 
governments). Apart from the traditional credit granting role of banks, they accept 
deposits, offer money transmission functions, offer business advisory services, help in 
implementing central bank monetary policies (Mishkin, 2006), acts as money-changers 
performing underwriting and brokerage functions (Madura, 2008). Banks have been 
seen to have superior informational economies which enable them to overcome the 
problem of information asymmetry which be-devils financial intermediation. In order to 
safeguard investments and ensure confidence in the financial system, central banks and  
international bodies recommend prudent measures in the conduct of business. The 
recent financial crisis has heightened the call for financial market discipline the greatest 
of which include loan default. The problem of loan default is prevalent in the US  
(Ghosh, 2015), Europe (Jiménez, Lopez, and Saurina, 2013) and other advanced 
economies (Fukuda, Kasuya, and Akashi, 2009) because the occurrence is a major 
contagion to the unsuspecting economic units who might have nothing to do directly 
with it. 
A critical look at most bank balance sheets suggest that loans single-handedly 
support the greatest proportion of the bank’s uses of funds (assets). At the macro level, 
loans and advances constitute 31.3% of total bank assets in Ghana (Bank of Ghana 
Annual Report, 2014). In emerging economies where banking activities don’t seem to 
be very much deepened and diversified, banking activities and products mainly centre 
on loans and advances. This situation places heavy reliance on loans for bank revenues 
and expectations from shareholders. It is also seen that business clients have very large 
loan portfolios as compared to individual clients. Thus banks have greater incentives to 
make funding opportunities available to business clients and some banks have 
departmentalized a section that concentrates on dealing with business customers. These 
dynamics leave the banks with no option than to be extra cautious in the origination, 
funding, servicing and monitoring of business clients during the loan granting exercise. 
In economies where the private sector is vibrant, there is the tendency for the 
creation of jobs and possible increase in GDP. This has been the success story behind 
most developed nations and governments in emerging economies are leaving no stone 
unturned to develop a vibrant private sector to support their economies. The successes 
of private businesses have thrived on meeting their financing needs of which the 
greatest proportion comes from banks (Dixon, Ritchie, and Siwale, 2007). More often 
than not, bank loans go bad, the cause of which is attributable to a mix of bank-specific 
factors, borrower characteristics and other macro-economic factors (Louzis, Vouldis 
and Metaxas, 2012). Such factors go a long way to increase the likelihood of loans 
default. When financial institutions take cognisance of these factors, cases of default 
which is attributable to such factors can be eliminated completely. Most research on 
default have focused on individual type of customers but it is about time business 
clients are also given the attention they deserve since they contribute so much to grow 
the economy. 
The menace of loan default has attracted the intervention of international 
organizations and institutions through the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(Basel I, II, III). The committee requires that, banks should have risk management 
committees, standardized procedures and acceptable ways of granting credit. The 
reliance of these risk-based approaches do not provide a panacea to loan default but 
some level of due diligence on the part of financial institutions and not being oblivious 
of research empirical factors that provide incentive for default. Borrower characteristics 
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has been found to have significant effect in determining the probability of default  
(Knapp and Seaks, 1992). The study by Knapp and Seaks was about individual personal 
loans. Jimenez and Saurina (2003) found that collateralized loans have higher 
probability of default. The same was found for close bank-borrower relationship by the 
authors. According to them, a close bank-borrower relationship increases the 
willingness to take more risks. The initiation, funding, servicing and monitoring of 
credit creates opportunistic tendencies of the parties involved (borrower and lender). 
There is usually an incentive for ex-post moral hazard issues that endangers the theory 
of financial intermediation (Andrieş, 2009). The studies by various authors who used 
non-performing loans as proxy for default in Europe concentrated on macro level 
factors very interesting results (Khieu, Mullineaux, and Yi, 2012; Makri et al., 2014; 
Messai and Jouni, 2013). The need for similar studies in emerging economies is very 
paramount. In cases where studies have done in developing economies, the 
concentration has been on individual or household clients (Awunyo-Vitor, 2012). The 
current study aligns with studying emerging economies but approaches it from business 
client’s perspective. This is because the development of the private sector has incentive 
to boost economies through the creation of jobs and improvement in living standards of 
the people (Ghana Banking Survey, 2013). 
With about sixteen branches operating nation-wide, the bank used for the study 
has operated as a universal bank for over eight years. The bank varied diversified 
products for its individual, business and corporate clients in and outside Ghana. The 
bank has a core mission to expand business development through financial 
intermediation in the best way possible to impact lives in emerging economies through 
customer-centric and shareholder value maximization. The rest of the section is 
organized into background, methods, analysis and results and conclusions. 
 
Background 
This section of the write-up covers a description of the Ghana banking industry, 
theoretical framework for the study, factors that have the p robability of causing loan 
default.  
 
Banking industry in Ghana  
 
The regulator of banking business in Ghana (Bank of Ghana) introduced the 
universal banking concept in September 2003 and banks have since diversified their 
portfolios and activities to make them financial super markets. The banking industry in 
Ghana consists of 27 universal banks dominated by foreign ownership. The breakdown 
of banks and their market shares for the past three years can be found in Table No.1. 
 
Table No.1 Bank ownership source and market share distribution 
 2012 2013 2014 
Banks  Number Market 
share(%) 
Number Market 
share(%) 
Number  Market 
share(%) 
Foreign:   14 55 14 58.2 14 53.9 
      Europe   3 20.1 3 18.1 3 15.7 
      Pan Africa  10 34.5 10 39.7 10 37.8 
     Others   1 0.4 1 0.4 1 0.4 
Domestic:   12 45 12 41.8 13 46.1 
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     State-owned  4 22.8 3 18.5 4 19 
     Private   8 22.2 9 23.3 9 27.2 
Total   26 100 26 100 27 100 
Source: Bank of Ghana Annual Report 2014 
The ownership structure exposes the banking industry to shocks from parent 
countries and international financial system especially with regards to counterparty 
relationships. The industry has close relation with allied support systems like credit 
reference bureaus and collateral registry which help minimize potential loan defaults 
(Bank of Ghana Annual Report, 2014). Credit in the form of loans and advances has 
been progressive in the past years with the year 2014 recording a 40% increase from the 
previous year. Figures from the Bank of Ghana Annual Report (2014) indicate that total 
credit to the private sector increased from 28.6% in 2013 to 42.3% in 2014. 
 
Theoretical framework 
 
Loan default, credit risk, non-performing loans are expressions with same 
connotation described as among the biggest source of bank worries (Al-Tamimi and Al-
Mazrooei, 2007; Haq, 2010); Mamiza Haq, Faff, Seth and Mohanty, 2014). Default is 
the likelihood that a borrower misses payment or does not meet the conditions of an 
agreement or indenture (Sobehart, Keenan and Stein, 2001). Loan default has been 
reported in many economies including advanced (Fukuda et al., 2009); (Jiménez et al., 
2013); (Saurina and Jimenez, 2006) and the consequences have been unpleasant. 
Excessive cases of loan default impair the reputation of the bank (Haq et al., 2014). 
Research on loan default has been approached by different authors from several 
perspectives. Among the theories used include the financial accelerator theory used by 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Kiyothaki and Moore (1997). Life-cycle consumption 
theories used by Lawrence (1995) as theoretical framework have been applicable to 
individual consumer type of loans. The theoretical support for the study is derived from 
the theory of financial intermediation and agency theory. According to Casu et al. 
(2006), the theory of financial intermediation answers the question of ‘why do banks 
exist?’ Twentieth century researchers on the theory of financial intermediation have 
chastised the theory’s basis for explaining the invaluable role of financial intermediaries 
in reducing the cost of transactions and information asymmetry (Andrieş, 2009; Claus 
and Grimes, 2003; Scholtens and van Wensveen, 2003). They argue that the advent of 
technology, deregulation and deepening financial markets reduce intermediation costs 
thus making financial intermediaries useless. Scholtens and van Wensveen contend that 
financial intermediaries do not create value as being touted and thus the theory fails to 
provide satisfactory reasons for the existence of financial intermediaries. The problem 
of loan default has exacerbated (Haq et al., 2014) and lenders have not been 
unquestionably efficient even with the advent of sophisticated technology, heavily 
deregulated financial environment and the existence of efficient financial markets. 
According to Casu et al. (2006), banks exist for five main reasons thus describing their 
core functions for which they are seen to have superior advantage as compared to direct 
finance where there are no intermediaries. These functions are: delegated monitoring, 
liquidity transformation, information production, consumption smoothing and 
commitment mechanisms. The dynamics of market activities, participants and 
sophisticated demand for finance calls for some dynamism in the traditional view of the 
theory of financial intermediation (Andries, 2009). Indeed transaction costs and 
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information asymmetry have been minimized through financial intermediaries (Claus 
and Grimes, 2003), but the issue of who monitors the intermediary creates an incentive 
to take a second look at the traditional theory (Claus and Grimes, 2003). When the 
financial intermediary exploits its informational economies, the tendency for the a gency 
problem is eminent in favour of the lender (Andrieş, 2009). Such incentives could 
motivate reckless credit granting processes (Haq, 2010), which could lead to swelling 
non-performing loans which endangers confidence in the financial system (Jiménez et 
al., 2013). The current study aligns with the theory of financial intermediation, but takes 
cognisance of the agency theory and possible exploitation of information asymmetry 
(Bolton and Freixas, 2000). To this end, lender and loan-specific factors have been 
explored so that a more holistic approach is given to address the issue of default which 
is a menace and believed to be the cause of major global financial crises (Cornett, 
McNutt, Strahan, and Tehranian, 2011; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). 
 
Factors leading to loan default 
 
The issue of loan default should not be mistaken for a deliberate act. There 
might be genuine reasons beyond the control of the borrower which might lead to 
default. Brehanu and Fufa (2008) classified them as voluntary and involuntary causes of 
loan default. However, the interest of this study is to delve into those factors which are 
avoidable and traceable to the borrower or lender. Lending institutions will normally 
have to assess their capability to grant credit to their clients  (Bastos, 2010). This is done 
by giving due consideration to the credit-worthiness of clients, availability of funds for 
onward transmission, adequacy of borrower collateral and existing regulations regarding 
the granting of loans by internal and external regulators (Barry, Mann, Mihov and 
Rodriguez, 2008). The probability of loan default is caused by many factors which 
could be clustered together as borrower characteristics, lender characteristics and loan 
characteristics (Abid, Ouertani, and Zouari-Ghorbel, 2014; Glennon and Nigro, 2005; 
Ghosh, 2015). We include another type of classification based on ownership 
characteristics, since this study is about business clients. 
 
Ownership characteristics: Coravos (2010) reported that the kind of business 
ownership or ownership structure could bring about default. Usually, sole proprietors 
are more susceptible to higher default as compared to ownership types with more 
members. The kind of collateral an owner has, has the probability of causing default 
(Jimenez and Saurina, 2003). The writers reported positive relation between the owner’s 
collateral and the likelihood of loan default. In cases where the owner has other source 
of income or any extra income, the possibility of default might be positive (Brehanu and 
Fufa, 2008). When the borrower has extra income apart from the business source, the 
tendency for reckless financial management is possible and default might occur. We 
therefore hypothesize from the above deliberations that: 
 
H1: Ownership characteristics can determine possible loan default 
 
Borrower characteristics: The location or distance between borrower and lending 
institution was used as determinant of demand for collateral (Jiménez, Salas and 
Saurina, 2009), but we try to test it for probability of default. Usually, when the 
borrower is located very close to the lender, monitoring is easier and might reduce the 
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likelihood of default. The age of the borrower was also determined by Mokhtar, Nartea, 
and Gan (2012) as possible cause of default. When the business has been in existence 
for long, they have enough experience to ensure sound financial management practices 
which could avert possible default. At times, over reliance on experience leads to 
financial indiscipline which could result in default. In the work of Mokhtar et al. they 
found strong positive correlation between multiple borrowing (which they referred to as 
extra loan) and the probability of default. The same result was found by Jimenez and 
Saurina (2003). Multiple borrowing increases the stress on the resources of the business 
which can result in default. The size of the business can determine default. Usually, 
small businesses default more frequently than large ones (Brehanu and Fufa, 2008). It 
was reported by Jimenez and Saurina (2003) that the kind of relationship a borrower has 
with the lender has the tendency to trigger default. They found a positive relation 
between borrower-lender relationship and probability of default. Borrowers with good 
relation have disincentive to default especially when the default is borrower-caused. 
This leads to our second hypothesis that: 
 
H2: Borrower characteristics can predict the probability of business loan default. 
 
Loan characteristics: There are several loan-specific factors that can lead to possible 
default (Foster and Zurada, 2013); (Khieu et al., 2012). The length of time to maturity 
of the loan described by some authors as loan age, or loan term has the probability of 
causing loan default. Loans that have longer period to maturity have higher probability 
of default (Roslan and Abd Karim, 2009). Even though their study was with individual 
clients within the microfinance industry, their finding is applicable to this current study.  
Mokhtar, Nartea and Gan (2012) found that the loan schedule could bring about default. 
Depending upon the frequency with which money flows into the business, servicing of 
loans should match the timing of the flow of money. It is most advisable for business 
loans to be serviced in periods less than one month intervals. The purpose of the loan 
could result in default. When the purpose is mostly different from expanding the 
business or adding up to direct production or provision of services, default looks very 
unavoidable (Herrington and Wood, 2003). The price of loan (interest rate) determines 
the probability of loan default (Salas and Saurina, 2002). The writers found from the 
Spanish banking industry that interest margin determined delinquency. We therefore 
hypothesize that: 
 
H3: Loan characteristics can determine the probability of business loan default 
 
Lender characteristics: Certain factors that are traceable to the lending institution can 
bring about default (Abid et al., 2014; Louzis et al., 2012). Faulkender and Petersen 
(2006) reported that the timing of loan approvals play critical role in the repayment 
capabilities of borrowers. When loan processing takes unnecessarily long time, 
borrowers might miss opportunities which might be time-bound and may lead to a 
diversion of the loan purpose. Herrington and Wood (2003) reported that shortages in 
the amount applied for by the borrower could bring about default. When financial 
institutions approve an amount lesser than what the applicant sought for, the purpose for 
which the loan was intended becomes difficult to accomplish and borrowers might 
divert the usage of the loan which can result in failure and possible default. The 
probability of loan default increases when borrowers divert the purpose for which the 
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loan was sought (Claessend, Krahnen, and Lang, 2005). It is therefore the duty of the 
bank to ensure that there is evidence of the loan purpose before it is approved. The 
interest charged which is the known as the price of the loan can increase default 
probability. Exorbitant interest rates put heavy demands on the borrowing thus making 
servicing of the loan very difficult. Coravos (2010) reported that high interest rates 
increase the probability of loan default. In this study, interest is mentioned as loan price. 
The deliberations above leads to the hypothesis that: 
 
H4: Lender characteristics can lead to business loan default. 
 
Methods 
Various authors have used different approaches to address the issue of default by 
approaching the study from either qualitative or quantitative approaches, studying 
individual clients or business clients, use of secondary or primary data. This study uses 
primary source of data studying business clients in a quantitative research design. The 
researchers used a survey design which allowed for careful design and scrutiny of the 
research instrument as has been emphasized by Robson (2011). Although the study has 
the attribute of a case study design where one universal bank was studied, the nation-
wide coverage of the branches allow for variability and possible generalization of the  
findings. The myriad of research designs employed in this study is to  enable the 
objectives of the study be realized. Among the objectives of the study include 
determining ownership-specific factors, borrower factors, loan and lender factors that 
have the tendency to trigger business loan default. These objectives were addressed 
through the test of four hypotheses which are stated below: 
 
H1: Ownership characteristics lead to business loan default 
H2: Borrower characteristics lead to business loan default 
H3: Loan-specific factors lead to business loan default 
H4: Lender characteristics lead to business loan default. 
 
The sample covers eleven branches spread across four regions of Ghana. The 
sampling techniques were both probabilistic and non-probabilistic strategies.  The non-
random sampling technique was the quota sampling technique where branches with 
higher number of business clients were given larger participation to reduce possible 
biases. After determining the number of business clients in a particular branch, random 
sampling technique was employed to give each business client equal chance of being 
selected for the study. Systematic random sampling technique was used where a random 
number was chosen (between 1-10) depending upon the quota given to each branch and 
the ‘nth’ random number chosen was selected from the loan files till the quota was 
exhausted. Out of three hundred (300) questionnaires distributed to various business 
clients of the bank, two hundred and fifty (250) were returned but two hundred and 
twenty four (224) were fully answered. The fully answered questionnaires were used for 
the analysis thus representing a response rate of about 75%. We use a binary logistic 
regression to determine the factors that signal the probability of business loans default. 
The data was coded into SPSS version 20 and the results analyzed. Most of the 
predictor variables that had more than two response alternatives in the questionnaire 
were re-coded in their categorical binary forms to satisfy the conditions for a binary 
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logistic regression. The summarized list of variables, their expected signs or directions 
of influence and their associated authors has been presented in Table No.1. 
Table No. 1 Variables and expected signs 
Variable Expected 
sign  
Author 
Owner-specific characteristics   
Ownership type (Business structure) +/- Coravos (2010) 
Owner’s collateral + Jimenez and Saurina (2003) 
Extra source of income + Brehanu and Fufa (2008) 
Borrower-characteristics   
Business age + Coravos (2010) 
Business size +/- Brehanu and Fufa (2008) 
Relationship with lender + Jimenez andSaurina (2003) 
Multiple borrowing  + Jimenez and Saurina (2003) 
Business location  +/- Jiménez, Salas and Saurina, (2009). 
Diversion of loan purpose + Claessend, Krahnen, and Lang, 2005 
Loan characteristics    
Purpose of loan +/- Herrington and Wood (2003) 
Age of loan (term) + Roslan and Abd Karim (2009) 
Repayment plan/schedule +/- Mokhtar, Nartea and Gan (2012) 
Loan price  + Coravos (2010) 
Lender characteristics    
Underfunding  + Herrington and Wood (2003) 
Delays in loan processing  + Faulkender and Petersen (2006) 
Source: Compiled by authors based on research in November 2015 
 
Model specification  
The logistic probability function is expressed as  
(1) P(Y = 1) =
1
1+𝑒−𝑧𝑖
  
Taking the natural logarithm  
(2) Zi = ln (
 𝑃
1−𝑃
) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1 + ⋯ 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑛 
Using a generalized logistic regression model to include the error term, the logit model 
for our study is expressed as 
(3) ln (
 𝑃
1−𝑃
) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑋1 + Φ2𝑋2 + 𝜓3 𝑋3 + 𝜆4𝑋4 + 𝜀        
where ln = the logarithm of the likelihood of the event  
?̂? = a binomial proportion 
X = explanatory variables 
𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜙, 𝜓, 𝜆 = parameters of the logistic model for constant, ownership characteristics, 
borrower characteristics, loan characteristics and lender characteristics respectively 
 
We introduce our variables into the general model for a logistic regression as: 
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(4) P(default)= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑋𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝜙1 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑋𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝜓1 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑋𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 +
𝜆1𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑋𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠  + 𝜀  
Where; default = 1 if a borrower misses a payment contrary to the loan agreement 
OwnXtics = Ownership characteristics listed in Table No.1 
BorrwXtics = Borrower characteristics 
LoanXtics = Loan characteristics 
lendXtics = Lender characteristics (found in Table No.1) 
𝜀 = Error term 
Expanding the equation to include all the variables to be estimated; 
(5) P(default)= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑇𝑦𝑝 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑤𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑤𝑛𝐸𝑥𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐 + 𝜙1 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝐴𝑔𝑒 +
𝜙2 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝜙3 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑊𝑖𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝜙4 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤 + 𝜙5 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝐿𝑜𝑐 +
𝜙6 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝 + 𝜓1 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝 + 𝜓2 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝜓3 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛 +
𝜓4 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 𝜆1𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑 + 𝜆2𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐 + 𝜀 
The explanations to the variables can be found in Table No.1 
 
Goodness of fit tests 
The Omnibus and Hosmer-Lemeshow tests were run to test the ‘goodness of fit’ 
of the model. The H-L test provides a Chi-Square test of whether or not the model is 
‘adequate fit’ to the data. The null hypothesis is that the model is a ‘good enough’ fit for 
the data and it is always appropriate that a significance value that rejects this null 
hypothesis be obtained for a good fit. The test of the predictive power of the set of 
individual coefficients of the model also known as the ‘goodness of fit test’ is shown by 
the Omnibus test. A highly significant value is most preferred. It can be seen that the 
model is highly significant at 95% confidence interval given significance value of 0.000 
(meaning p<0.0005). The Chi-square value is 186.1 with 15 degrees of freedom. This 
means the model is able to distinguish between respondents who defaulted from those 
who did not experience default of any kind. A further ‘goodness of fit’ test is the 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test which prescribes that a significance value less than 0.05 is 
an indication of poor fit. The Chi-square value for the Hosmer-Lemeshow test is 12.192 
with 8 degrees of freedom and a significance value of 0.143. The significance value is 
far above 0.05 therefore indicating support for our model. 
Table No.2 Goodness of fit tests 
Goodness of fit Tests of Model Coefficients 
     Omnibus test Chi-square df Sig. 
 
Step  186.102 15 .000 
Block 186.102 15 .000 
Model 186.102 15 .000 
 Hosmer-Lemeshow test  12.192 8 .143 
Source: Field survey, 2013 
 
The model is able to accurately predict the correct category which in this case is 
the probability that a borrower defaults in loan repayment. The result indicates that the 
model is able to predict by 94.7% accurately that a borrower might default in one way 
or the other in the repayment. This prediction accuracy shows the sensitivity of the 
model. The non-defaulters are predicted by 83.8% (Appendix 2) accuracy and this 
indicates the specificity of the model. The overall accuracy prediction is 91.1% which is 
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very good for a study of this kind. There were weak correlation coefficients (less than or 
equal to 0.5) in a correlation matrix which indicates the absence of multicollinearity. 
None of the predictors had correlation coefficients more than 0.5. 
 
Results and discussions 
 
There were 224 business customers studied out of which 67% indicated default 
of a kind. The binary coding of the variables for the purpose of the logistic regression 
can be found in Appendix 1. The model summary provides more reliable information 
usefulness of the general model. The Cox & Snell R Square and the Nagelkerke R 
Square (Appendix 2) reports on the amount of variation of the outcome variable 
(default) explained by the model (0>p*d<1). These values do not represent the true R 
square but the pseudo R square statistics since logistic regression does not measure 
linearity per se. The result indicates that, between 56.4% to 78.5% of variations in the 
probability of a business client defaulting in loan repayment is explained by the set of 
ownership, borrower-specific, loan-specific and lender specific variables. Out of the 
fifteen predictor variables included in the model, nine of them were significant 
predictors at 95% confidence interval. The significant variables fell under each of the 
categories of predictors.  
Owner’s extra income (beta coefficient=2.102; sig=0.006) was the only 
ownership characteristic that showed significant positive relation with the probability of 
default. The odds ratio shown under B(EXP) column reports that owner’s extra income 
could determine the probability of default by more than 8 times. The result is not 
different from that of Brehanu and Fufa (2008) who reported a non-directional relation 
between the two variables. 
There were three borrower characteristics that show significant positive 
relationships with the probability of default. The size of the business (Wald test=6.833; 
B=2.023) which were coded as small or large had significance value of 0.009 and odds 
ratio 7.558 meaning it could predict default as many as over 7 times. Brehanu and Fufa 
(2008) reported that usually small businesses are potential defaulters than large size 
businesses. The same is confirmed in this study because about 52% of the businesses 
involved were small scale types and it is not surprising they show significantly positive 
relation with default probability. The study again reports that multiple borrowing (Wald 
test=9.517; S.E=0.726; B=2.241; sig=0.002) show significant positive relation with 
default probability predicting default probability by about 9times. When customers have 
loans with other institutions, there is too much pressure and demand on the resources of 
the business and defaulting becomes an option for such a borrower. Jimenez and 
Saurina (2003) found same result in their study. Diversion of loan purpose (Wald 
test=5.568; B=2.461; sig=0.018) showed positive significant relation with default 
probability and could predict the outcome variable by about 12times. The result is 
consistent with Claessend, Krahnen and Lang (2005). When loans meant for business 
expansion are used for other purposes, it is more likely that the motivation to repay 
promptly will be jeopardized. 
All the four loan characteristics variables showed strong significance with 
default probability. The purpose of loan (Wald test=19.188; sig=0.000; B=3.870) which 
were coded as for expansion (67.4%) and other purposes (32.6%) significantly 
determined the probability of loan default with as many 48times prediction determined 
from the odds ratio (47.944). Herrington and Wood (2003) reported that loan purpose 
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can significantly determine the probability of default. We confirm a significant positive 
relationship from our study. Interestingly, all the other loan characteristic variables 
reported significant negative relation with probability of default but very low and weak 
odds ratios less than 1. The result on cost of fund or loan price (B= -2.297; sig=0.005) is 
inconsistent with the works (Salas & Saurina, 2002) and Coravos (2010) who rather 
found a positive relation with default probability. The odds ratio is very low and weak 
(0.101). The result on correlation coefficient is not surprising, because about 69% of the 
respondents indicated lower cost of loan, which is contrary to a perceived high interest 
rate. The respondents indicated that loan age (B= -2.001; sig=0.015) was of short term 
(72%) nature meaning it was one year or less. Usually, long term loans are prone to 
default more than short term ones and since there were more short-term loan 
respondents, reporting negative marginal effect is not surprising. Again, we find a 
contrary report by Roslan and Abd Karim (2009) who rather found a positive relation. 
The repayment plan for business loans should be quite short and regular. We find 
significant negative relation between loan repayment plan (B= -5.090; sig=0.001) and 
the probability of loan default. Mokhtar, Nartea and Gan (2012) predicted a non-
directional relation, but we report a negative relation. Most respondents were paying 
their loans monthly, a situation which is uncommon with most small scale short term 
business loans. 
The only significant lender characteristic was underfunding (B=2.953; 
sig=0.000; Wald test=17.183). Usually, during loan assessment, the lender can 
recommend the approval of loan amount in shortage of the applied sum. This was found 
to have significant positive marginal effect thereby increasing the probabil ity of default 
in a direct manner. The odds ratio reports 19times ability to predict default probability. 
We find consistency with the work of Herrington and Wood (2003). 
 
Conclusions  
 
The study used a logistic regression to predict the determinants of business loan 
default. Fifteen variables categorized under ownership, borrower, loan and lender 
characteristics were involved out of which nine determinants were found to be 
significant. The nine variables fell under all the four broad classifications thus 
sustaining the alternate hypotheses that ownership, borrower, loan and lender 
characteristics predicted the probability of loan default. Most bank business customers 
operate the sole proprietorship ownership structure and the businesses are of small scale 
nature located not very near to the banks. This calls for effective and constant 
monitoring in order to minimize loan default thereby making sense of the theory of 
financial intermediation. Such customers apply for short term loans for the purpose of 
expanding their businesses. This calls for the design of loan products tailored to meet 
such needs of business clients.  Ownership characteristics, borrower characteristics, loan 
characteristics and lender characteristics have significant marginal effects on 
determining the probability of business clients defaulting in the loans applied for. The 
individual determinants are owner’s extra income (ownership characteristics), size of 
business, multiple borrowing, diversion of purpose (borrower characteristics), purpose 
of loan, age of loan, repayment plan, loan price (loan characteristics) and underfunding 
(lender characteristics). The significant determinants of the probability of business loan 
default when arranged in hierarchy of their predictive strength is as follows: loan 
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purpose, underfunding, diversion of loan purpose, multiple borrowing, owner’s extra 
income, size of business, loan age, loan price and loan repayment plan.  
The limitations we can report is the fact that the data was collected two years 
ago (2013) which could make some of the responses not as current as it would have 
been in 2015. Again, there was no robust test of multicollinearity but the use correlation 
coefficients in a correlation matrix. However, this does not cast any doubt about the 
originality and reliability of the results. The study has implications for financial 
intermediaries to be very mindful of ownership, borrower, loan and lender 
characteristics that determine loan default. It is not enough for credit institutions to use 
credit rating quantitative models alone in financial intermediation. A holistic approach 
to minimize the loan default is a myriad of approaches including the determinants 
identified (especially significant ones) and even macro economic factors which could be 
captured as error term. Bank customers will find this research useful, because being 
aware of factors that relate to borrowers and observing them profile them as good 
clients whose loan applications cannot be turned down. This will help make the private 
sector, seen to be the engine of growth of emerging economies, function fully to 
contribute to the growth of GDP.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1. Categorical Variables Coding  
 Frequency Parameter coding 
(1) 
Ownership Structure 
Other forms of 
ownership 
71 .000 
Sole Proprietor 153 1.000 
Size of business 
Large 108 .000 
Small 116 1.000 
Location of business 
from bank 
Near 71 .000 
Far 153 1.000 
Relationship with bank 
Long 122 .000 
Short 102 1.000 
Diversion of loan 
purpose 
No 173 .000 
Yes 51 1.000 
Cost of funds 
Low 154 .000 
High 70 1.000 
Loan Age 
Short term 161 .000 
Long term 63 1.000 
Loan repayment plan 
Short 30 .000 
Long 194 1.000 
Multiple borrowing 
No 135 .000 
Yes 89 1.000 
Delays in loan 
processing 
No 69 .000 
Yes 155 1.000 
Extra Source of Income 
apart from business 
Yes 67 .000 
No 157 1.000 
Underfunding 
No 98 .000 
Yes 126 1.000 
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Collateral Provided 
Yes 186 .000 
No 38 1.000 
Purpose of loan 
Expansion 151 .000 
Other purposes 73 1.000 
Duration in Business 
Not New in Business 135 .000 
New in Business 89 1.000 
Source: Field survey, 2013 
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Appendix 2. Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
 Ownership characteristics         
 Business ownership -1.168 .829 1.982 1 .159 .311 .061 1.581 
 Owner’s collateral -.085 .838 .010 1 .919 .918 .178 4.746 
 Owner’s extra income * 2.105 .771 7.451 1 .006 8.204 1.810 37.180 
 Borrower characteristics         
 
Age of Business .604 .650 .864 1 .353 1.829 .512 6.536 
Size of Business * 2.023 .774 6.833 1 .009 7.558 1.659 34.439 
Business Location .240 .627 .147 1 .702 1.272 .372 4.349 
Bank relationship  .113 .660 .029 1 .864 1.120 .307 4.083 
Multiple borrowing * 2.241 .726 9.517 1 .002 9.404 2.264 39.053 
Diversion of Purpose * 2.461 1.043 5.568 1 .018 11.715 1.517 90.446 
Loan characteristics         
Purpose * 3.870 .883 19.188 1 .000 47.944 8.486 270.867 
Loan Price * -2.297 .821 7.829 1 .005 .101 .020 .503 
Loan Age * -2.001 .819 5.963 1 .015 .135 .027 .674 
Repayment Plan * -5.090 1.251 16.567 1 .000 .006 .001 .071 
Lender characteristics          
Underfunding * 2.953 .712 17.183 1 .000 19.170 4.744 77.458 
Delays in Processing -.016 .823 .000 1 .985 .984 .196 4.940 
Constant .782 1.491 .275 1 .600 2.185   
 -2 Log likelihood 98.123        
 Cox & Snell R Square              0.564        
 Nagelkerke R Square 0.785        
    Overall % prediction                          91.1% 
    Total observations                             224 
    *significant variables in the model 
Source: Field survey, 2013 
 
 
 
 
